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I. INTRODUCTION 
Crime statistics show that there are over 2,000 
firearm-related domestic violence incidents in Tennessee 
every year.2 In recognition of the threat that firearms pose to 
 
1 Joshua M. Anderson is a graduate of the University of Tennessee College 
of Law.  The author would like to thank Professor Jo Ann Lehberger, of 
the University of Tennessee Domestic Violence Clinic, for her inspiration 
and guidance in writing this article. 
2 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2018 (2019), 
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/tbi/documents/tibrs/2018%20Domestic
%20Violence_Final.pdf; TENNESSEE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 2017 (2018), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/tbi/documents/ 
tibrs/Domestic%20Violence%202017_Final.pdf; TENNESSEE BUREAU OF 
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victims of domestic violence, both Congress and the 
Tennessee General Assembly have enacted firearm bans on 
individuals that have orders of protection entered against 
them.3  
For the restrictions to apply, however, certain 
findings and orders must be explicitly in the order of 
protection, and certain procedures must be followed.4 The 
restrictions also do not apply in all cases: only those 
involving “intimate partners” as defined by federal law.5 In 
at least one instance in Tennessee, a lack of adherence to 
these statutes led to a reversal of conviction on appeal.6  
It is imperative that judges enter orders of protection 
that carefully track the statutory language.7 Tennessee’s 
court forms should be adapted to serve as a useful tool for 
this purpose and to ensure compliance on the part of all 
parties. This article will briefly examine the order of 
protection firearms restrictions, note some important points 
to consider in practice, and advocate for reformation of 
Tennessee order of protection forms to meet the applicable 
standards. 
II. TENNESSEE FIREARMS RESTRICTIONS 
Tennessee’s firearm restrictions for orders of 
protection are really just the federal restrictions. Tennessee 
Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(f) makes it a Class A 
misdemeanor8 for an individual that is “subject to an order 
of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)” 
to possess a firearm.9 The main takeaway from this provision 
is that the text of the statute does not say “substantially 
 
INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2016 (2017), https://www.tn.gov/ 
content/dam/tn/tbi/documents/Domestic_Violence_2016_final2.pdf. 
3 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1307(f) (2021). 
4 Id. 
5 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2021); 18 U.S.C. § 921(32) (2021) (defining the term 
“intimate partner”). 
6 State v. Carman-Thacker, No. M2014-01859-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 Tenn. 
Crim. App. LEXIS 728, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015). 
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2021). 
8 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1307(f)(4) (2021). 
9 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1307(f)(1)(B) (2021). 
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complies,” it says “fully complies,” meaning each element of 
the federal statute must be met.10  
Tennessee courts have interpreted this requirement 
literally.11 The Court of Appeals in Long v. Brown held that 
an order of protection did not fully comply with the Federal 
law when it did not include the specific federal statutory 
language.12 The order did not restrain the respondent as 
prescribed by law or have the required findings on its face.13 
III. FEDERAL FIREARMS RESTRICTIONS 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) makes it a crime for anyone that 
is subject to a court order meeting the statute’s requirements 
from possessing a firearm.  
Importantly, the ban is only applicable to orders that 
restrain an individual’s conduct towards an “intimate 
partner.”14 An “intimate partner” is defined for purposes of 
this statute as: 
with respect to a person, the spouse of the 
person, a former spouse of the person, an 
individual who is a parent of a child of the 
person, and an individual who cohabitates or 
has cohabited with the person.15 
“Intimate partner” is notably narrower than the 
“domestic abuse victim”16 that is permitted to seek an order 
of protection under Tennessee law.17 Even more importantly, 
“intimate partner” does not categorically encompass the even 
broader “stalking victim” or “sexual assault victim” that may 
seek an order of protection in Tennessee.18 As such, in many 
Tennessee cases, the firearm restrictions are not applicable 
 
10 See Long v. Brown, No. E2013-00802-COA-R3-CV, 2014 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 29, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).  
11 Id.; Carman-Thacker, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 728 at *20. 
12 Brown, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 at *20. 
13 Id.  
14 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2021). 
15 18 U.S.C. § 921(32) (2021). 
16 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5) (2021). 
17 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(a) (2021). 
18 Id. 
71                      8 LMU LAW REVIEW 3 (2021)  
 
   
 
because the parties are not “intimate partners” as defined by 
federal law.  
For the restrictions to be applicable, the order must 
have been “issued after a hearing of which [the respondent] 
received actual notice, and at which [the respondent] had an 
opportunity to participate . . . .”19 The requirement of notice 
and hearing with an opportunity to be heard is why the 
firearms ban is not applicable for ex parte orders of 
protection – which are issued at the initiation of a petition 
and prior to a full hearing.20 
The federal statute also requires the terms of the 
order to include several explicit findings and restrictions.21 
An order of protection must: 
include a finding that the person it is entered 
against “represents a credible threat to the 
physical safety of such intimate partner or 
child . . . ”22  
restrain the person from “harassing, stalking, 
or threatening an intimate partner of such 
person or child of such intimate partner or 
person, or engaging in other conduct that 
would place an intimate partner in reasonable 
fear of bodily injury to the partner or child . . . 
”23 
“by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against such intimate partner or child 
that would reasonably be expected to cause 
bodily injury . . . .”24 
 
19 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A) (2021). 
20 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (2021). 
21 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2021). 
22 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) (2021). 
23 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(B) (2021). 
24 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) (2021).  
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If these requirements are met by the order of protection, then 
the federal firearms ban (and thus the state ban) is effective 
against the respondent. 
IV. TENNESSEE DISPOSSESSION AND DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS 
Upon the issuance of an order of protection that 
effectuates the firearms restrictions, the respondent has 
forty-eight (48) hours to dispossess themselves of any 
firearms in their possession “by any lawful means.”25 They 
also must complete an “affidavit of firearms dispossession,” 
attesting that they have complied with this requirement.26 
Knowingly failing to dispossess a firearm is itself a crime, 
punishable as a Class A misdemeanor for each violation.27  
An order of protection is required to specifically order 
and instruct a respondent about dispossession of firearms.28 
Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-625(b) provides that the 
court must order the respondent: 
To terminate the respondent’s physical 
possession of the firearms in the respondent's 
possession by any lawful means, such as 
transferring possession to a third party who is 
not prohibited from possessing firearms, 
within forty-eight (48) hours; 
To complete and return the affidavit of firearm 
dispossession form created pursuant to 
subsection (e), which the court may provide 
the respondent or direct the respondent to the 
administrative office of the courts' website; 
and 
That if the respondent possesses firearms as 
business inventory or that are registered 
under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. §§ 
 
25 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-625(b)(1) (2021). 
26 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-625(d) (2021). 
27 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-113(h)(1) (2021). 
28 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-625(b) (2021). 
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5801 et seq.), there are additional statutory 
provisions that may apply and shall include 
these additional provisions in the content of 
the order. 
Additionally, if the order meets the standards of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(8), the order on its face must provide the respondent 
with disclosures set out in the statute informing them about 
the dispossession, the prohibition of possessing a firearm, 
and that possessing a firearm or failing to dispossess of one 
is a violation of the law.29 
Recognizing the importance of respondents receiving 
disclosures about restrictions before their hearing, the 
General Assembly specifically required that the 
administrative office of the courts include disclosures in their 
promulgated petition for an order of protection form.30 The 
petition must include language that is “substantially 
similar” to that which is provided in the statute itself.31 
V. FAILURE TO ADHERE TO STATUTORY LANGUAGE LEADS 
TO INEFFECTIVE ORDERS OF PROTECTION 
In State v. Carman-Thacker, the Tennessee Court of 
Criminal Appeals reversed a conviction of twelve counts of 
unlawful possession of a firearm and twelve counts of 
violating an order of protection, when the underlying order 
did not meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).32 The 
defendant, in that case, had an order of protection entered 
against her that had been brought by her niece.33 The order 
of protection did contain “‘subtitles’ that prohibited her from 
possessing firearms.”34 However, the court concluded that a 
niece, who had not cohabitated with the defendant, was not 
an “intimate partner” for purposes of the federal statute.35 
 
29 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-625(a) (2021). 
30 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(c) (2021). 
31 Id. 
32 Carman-Thacker, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 728 at *19-20. 
33 Id. at *19. 
34 Id. at *7. 
35 Id. at *19-20. 
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The court vacated the convictions and dismissed all 
charges.36 
In Long v. Brown, the respondent attacked an order 
of protection entered against him on various grounds, 
including that the disclosures of Tennessee Code Annotated 
§ 36-3-625(a) were not in the order.37 The appellate court 
concluded that the disclosures were not required because the 
order of protection did not fully comply with the provisions 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).38  
These two cases illustrate the importance of making 
sure that the proper findings and other requirements are met 
in an order of protection – otherwise the order is wholly 
ineffective in prohibiting applicable respondents from 
possessing firearms. Lack of accuracy leads to costly, 
needless litigation, as in Long v. Brown,39 or a defendant who 
otherwise would have been successfully convicted for 
violating an order of protection, instead going without 
consequence, as in State v. Carman-Thacker.  
This should also serve as a harbinger for cases in 
which a petitioner and respondent seek an agreed order with 
no findings of facts or only certain restrictions provided for 
in the order. If it is the parties’ or court’s intent that the 
firearm restrictions be in effect, the order must still meet the 
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) – otherwise, the ban is 
not applicable. This also highlights an even larger problem 
that is outside the scope of this article, as orders of protection 
must meet certain requirements and contain certain findings 
to be generally effective at all.40 
 
36 Id. at *20. 
37 Brown, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 at *19-20. 
38 Id. at *20. 
39 A case that, interesting enough, the petitioner would likely have been 
an “intimate partner” and otherwise met the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(8) if the facial requirements were met in the order. See Carman-
Thacker, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 728 at *1 (the petitioner was “the 
man with whom [respondent] had lived for approximately 27 years”). 
40 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-113(f) (2021). 
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VI. TENNESSEE NEEDS TO MODIFY ITS ORDER OF 
PROTECTION FORM 
The Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts 
promulgates a variety of forms that may be used in order of 
protection cases.41 This is done, admirably, to assist local 
clerks of court in their duty to provide forms to petitioners 
necessary to seek an order of protection42 and for the Office 
to meet its statutory requirements,43 including those relating 
to firearm restrictions.44 Notably, several local courts use 
their own forms,45 though state law requires that the forms 
provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts be used 
exclusively by all courts.46 
The state order of protection form, as it is 
promulgated at the date of this publication, does not meet all 
the facial requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) necessary to 
effectuate the firearms ban.47 The form does a good job of 
clearly defining the relationship of the petitioner and 
respondent for purposes of the “intimate partner” 
determination.48 The form includes a default finding that the 
“Respondent was given reasonable notice of the hearing and 
an opportunity to be heard,”49 seemingly meeting the 
requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A), ‒ though it deviates 
from the term “actual notice” in the federal statute.50 The 
form also includes another default finding that “there is 
credible evidence that Respondent is a threat to the safety of 
the Petitioner and [] Petitioner’s Minor Children.”51 This 
 
41 See TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ORDER OF 
PROTECTION FORMS, https://www.tncourts.gov/programs/self-help-center/ 
forms/order-protection-forms (last visited December 11, 2020). 
42 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(a) (2021). 
43 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(b) (2021). 
44 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(c) (2021). 
45 The author is aware that at least Knox County and Davidson County 
Courts currently use their own forms. 
46 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(d) (2021). 
47 See TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, FORM #OP2018-
7 (07/01/19), http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/order_of_ 
protection_7.1.2019.pdf (last visited December 11, 2020). 
48 TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURT, supra note 46, at 1. 
49 TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURT, supra note 46, at 2. 
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A) (2021). 
51 TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURT, supra note 46, at 2. 
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seeks to fulfill the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(8)(C)(i), though it does not use the exact language 
“represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such 
intimate partner or child.”52 
Notably absent from the order of protection form are 
the explicit orders that restrain the person from “harassing, 
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person 
or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in 
other conduct that would place an intimate partner in 
reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child . . . .”53 
The order form’s terms also do not explicitly prohibit "the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably 
be expected to cause bodily injury . . . .”54 
While the Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, 
indicated that more broad terms like “abuse” might satisfy 
some of the above requirements,55 other courts have taken a 
more literal approach.56 The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
in Magoon v. Thoroughgood held that when a trial court did 
not use the “explicit” language provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(8) ‒ which in contrast was used in New Hampshire’s 
state domestic violence form – the trial court erred in barring 
the respondent from being returned his firearms.57 
While one might speculate how Tennessee courts or 
federal courts might interpret Tennessee’s form provisions 
and whether they meet the federal standards, it is also 
important for purposes of full faith and credit to consider how 
other states might construe them. This is an idea that did 
not pass by the General Assembly which admonished the 
Administrative Office of the Courts that “[t]o the extent 
 
52 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) (2021)(emphasis added). 
53 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(B) (2021). 
54 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) (2021). 
55 United States v. Hopper, 28 F. App’x 376, 379 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Although 
‘domestic violence and abuse’ is language which may contemplate a 
broader range of activity than physical assault, we believe that the 
language is sufficiently explicit so as to include actual, attempted and 
threatened physical force within its meaning.”) 
56 Magoon v. Thoroughgood, 148 N.H. 139 (N.H. 2002). 
57 Id. at 143. 
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possible, the forms shall be uniform with those promulgated 
by surrounding states so that Tennessee forms may be 
afforded full faith and credit.”58 Other states currently have 
order of protection forms that track the federal statutory 
language exactly.59 
For Tennessee courts to ensure that applicable orders 
of protection effectuate the state/federal firearms ban on 
respondents and to ensure other states give full faith and 
credit to these orders, the Tennessee Administrative of the 
Courts should modify its order of protection form to track the 
exact language provided for in the federal statutes. The 
Tennessee judiciary should also require that all local courts 
abide by the requirement60 that they use these uniform state 
forms in practice. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
When it comes to the state and federal firearms bans 
– it matters what language is used in the findings, 
restrictions, and other terms of an order of protection. 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) provides specific requirements of what an 
order must include, and it narrowly defines who such an 
order applies against.61 Judges and practitioners should pay 
close attention to what is written, check marked, and 
included in a form order of protection. The Tennessee 
Administrative Office of the Courts should also modify 
Tennessee’s forms to ensure they are a useful tool in this 
practice.  
 
58 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(b) (2021). 
59 See, e.g., GA. SUPER. CT. CLERKS' COOP. AUTH., FAMILY VIOLENCE TWELVE 
MONTH PROTECTIVE ORDER ADDED - 09/18/2014, https://www.gsccca.org/ 
docs/familyviolencedocuments/sc16_family_violence_twelve_month_prote
ctive_order.pdf?sfvrsn=c27bca28_2 (last visited December 11, 2020). 
60 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(d) (2021). 
61 See also 18 U.S.C. § 921(32) (2021). 
